A mineradora Vale S.A., ativamente atuante na região de Mariana e Ouro Preto, no Estado de Minas Gerais, idealizou um projeto direcionado à Educação Patrimonial que durante 8 anos foi considerado como um dos principais projetos com viés cultural da região. Neste contexto, considerando que a Educação Patrimonial é de extrema importância para a formação da identidade cultural e social do indivíduo autônomo, objetiva-se analisar, sob a perspectiva crítica, as inter-relações entre o Programa de Educação Patrimonial Trem da Vale com (...) o conceito que carrega a Indústria Cultural, conforme cunhado pelos teóricos críticos Theodor Adorno e Horkheimer no livro “Dialética do Esclarecimento” (1985). Para tanto, para a realização da análise empírica utilizou-se como categoria de sentido a tese de Francisco Rüdiger (2004) sobre os esquematismos interpretativos comumente presentes nas práticas da Indústria Cultural. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, troth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

This study aims to examine the ethical decision-making model proposed by Schwartz, where we consider the factors of non-rationality and aspects that affect ethical judgments of auditors to make the decision to blow the whistle. In this paper, we argue that the intention of whistleblowing depends on ethical awareness and ethical judgment as well as there is a mediation–moderation due to emotion and perceived moral intensity of auditors. Data were collected using an online survey with 162 external auditors who worked (...) on audit firms in Indonesia as well as 173 internal auditors working in the manufacturing and financial services. The result of multigroup analysis shows that emotion can mediate the relationship between EAW and EJW. The nature of this relationship is more complex and then tested by adding moderating variables using consistent partial least squares approach. We found that EMT and PMI can improve the relationship between ethical judgments and whistleblowing intentions. These findings indicate that internal auditors are more likely to blow the whistle than external auditors; and reporting wrongdoing internally and anonymously are the preferred way of professional accountants to blow the whistle in Indonesia. (shrink)

Emotions are Janus‐faced. They tell us something about the world, and they tell us something about ourselves. This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truths of emotions, one of which is about self and the other about conditions in the world. On some views, the latter comes by means of the former. Insofar as emotions manifest our inner life, however, we are more inclined to speak of authenticity rather than truth. What is the (...) difference? We need to distinguish the criteria of correspondence or appropriateness suitable for authenticity from those that embody the criterion of truth. Furthermore there is also a question about the transitions – among states of mind, and between states of mind and behaviour – that emotions encourage. This realm of transitions concerns rationality. After sketching the relevant distinctions, I will endeavour to justify the view that emotions should be appraised in terms of all three terms. (shrink)

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

This work empirically tests the concept of the ‘whistleblowing triangle,’ which is modeled on the three factors encapsulated by the fraud triangle (pressure or financial incentives, opportunity and rationalization), in the Indonesian context. Anchored in the proposition of an original research framework on the whistleblowing triangle and derived hypotheses, this work aims to expand the body of knowledge on this topic by providing empirical evidence. The sample used is taken from audit firms affiliated with both the big 4 and non-big (...) 4 companies operating in Indonesia. The results of analysis using the PLS-PM method found a significant relationship between the components of the whistleblowing triangle and the intention of blowing the whistle. We found that financial incentives are the most significant predictor of auditors’ intention to blow the whistle in Indonesia. Other components, such as opportunity and rationalization, also play an important role in supporting auditors’ intention to blow the whistle. Our findings also suggest that related pressures are the top priority for audit firms in Indonesia to consider in increasing whistleblowing intention. We expand the previous literature on whistleblowing which has been derived from the components of the fraud triangle (Brown et al. in Account Public Interest 16(1):28–56, 2016; Smaili and Arroyo in J Bus Ethics, 10.1007/s10551-017-3663-7, 2017) by adding empirical evidence. (shrink)

Este artigo visa analisar a narrativa (auto)biográfica de estudantes de Pedagogia em uma universidade pública da região do Vale do São Francisco, localizada no território de Petrolina-PE em contexto de pandemia da COVID-19. Para refletir sobre a formação a partir da escrita de si, pautamo-nos, teórica e metodologicamente, em Heidegger, Josso, Freire, Ribeiro, Passeggi, Sousa e Lima. Neste artigo, comtempla-se respostas referentes à como os estudantes se sentiram no processo de formação docente em meio a pandemia e o que (...) esperavam do futuro. A turma do curso de Pedagogia era composta por 19 estudantes, deste total, 17 participaram da atividade da escrita da carta a si. Como estratégia de análise, utilizou-se o método do círculo hermenêutico “heideggeriano”. Assim, as informações foram organizadas em três temas de sentido, sendo: saúde mental na pandemia; ensino remoto versus ensino presencial; e planejamento de carreira. Percebeu-se, por meio das cartas, a preocupação quanto ao ensino remoto, assim como os planos de futuro, com intenção contribuir socialmente para uma educação humana e facilitadora de aprendizagens. Notou-se, ainda, que os estudantes refletiram sobre o bem-estar na profissão, buscando o sentido de suas ações, além de demarcarem o suporte financeiro, emocional, familiar e formativo. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multi-dimensional and relative to human realities. The "axiological" position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

Do we love someone for their virtue, their beauty, or their moral or other qualities? Are love's characteristic desires altruistic or selfish? Are there duties of love? What do the sciences tell us about love? In this Very Short Introduction, Ronald de Sousa explores the different kinds of love, from affections to romantic love.

Femininity and whiteness dominate Western nursing, silencing ontologies and epistemologies that do not align with these dominant norms while perpetuating systemic racism and discrimination in nursing practice, education, research, nursing activism, and sociopolitical structures. We propose Black feminist thought as a praxis to decenter, deconstruct, and unseat these ideologies and systems of power. Drawing from the work of past and present Black feminist scholars, we examine the ontological and epistemological perspectives of Black feminist thought. These include (i) the uniqueness and (...) particular experiences of people, (ii) the acceptance of ontological and epistemological pluralism of truths and ways of knowing, and (iii) the mandate for equity in the health, social, political, and environmental structures of society. By focusing our attention on lived experiences and voices of those systematically excluded in nursing practice, education, research, and society, Black feminist thought offers an anticolonial, antiracist, and antidiscriminatory foundation for more effectively upholding nursing's disciplinary mandate for social justice and equity. (shrink)

There are those who believe that modern society's reliance upon law, politics and science to both regulate and emancipate society has reached a crisis point and can no longer provide answers to current social problems. Toward a New Legal Common Sense engages in a series of sociological analyses of law in order to illustrate the need for a profound theoretical reconstruction of the notion of legality based on locality, nationality and globality. In this way the author shows how developments including (...) suprastate organisations such as the European Union and international human rights law can be given their proper place in the sociology of law, and suggests a new set of social structures that might sustain the emancipatory elements that have disappeared from modern society. This 2002 edition, of a title originally published by Routledge, is part of the acclaimed Law in Context Series, whose aim is to develop broad interdisciplinary perspectives on law. Toward a New Legal Common Sense is written for students taking law and globalisation courses, and political science, philosophy and sociology students doing optional subjects. (shrink)

Os registros históricos humanos sofreram transformações à medida em que evoluíam as tecnologias. Quanto maior a evolução tecnológica, mais informações puderam ser disseminadas. O objetivo desta pesquisa é discutir as possíveis similaridades entre a Ciência da Informação e as nuances pós-modernas. Como procedimentos metodológicos apresenta uma pesquisa de natureza qualitativa e exploratória baseada em uma revisão bibliográfica. O estudo possibilitou a confirmação dos elementos relacionais para uma compreensão dialógica entre a pós-modernidade, a complexidade e a Ciência da Informação. O pensamento (...) pós-moderno questiona paradigmas consolidados na Ciência Moderna, contrapondo-se às ideias e práticas inerentes ao pensamento científico baseado no paradigma dominante, mais especificamente nos preceitos provenientes do racionalismo científico, da visão reducionista e da discrepante realidade de grupos sociais. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, truth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

Discute-se aqui as aproximações e distanciamentos sobre o cuidado via as contribuições do pensamento de Heidegger e de Foucault. Interessa-nos saber sobre as ideias de autocuidado articuladas por Martin Heidegger e de cuidado de sí, conforme Michel Foucault, analisando as convergências e as divergências. Lançou-se mão da sistematização contrastiva de modo a ressaltar os encontros e desencontros entre os pensadores. Há aproximações no que se refere a importância dada a questão do cuidar como algo constituidor do ser humano, mas os (...) distanciamentos se dão pelo modo como os sentidos de cuidado são concebidos. As aproximações e distanciamentos quanto a autocuidado e cuidado de si pensados por Heidegger e Michel Foucault nos lança a refletir que cada pensador fora atravessado por singularidades, processos históricos, sociais e culturais, desdobrando em compreensões específicas em torno do cuidado. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics (...) of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. (shrink)

Nothing seems to follow strictly from 'X believes that p'. But if we reinterpret it to mean: 'X can consistently be described as consistently believing p'--which roughly renders, I think, Hintikka's notion of "defensibility"--we can get on with the subject, freed from the inhibitions of descriptive adequacy. But defensibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth: it tells us little, therefore, about the concept of belief on which it is based. It cannot, in particular, specify necessary conditions for the consistent (...) ascription of belief--as opposed to rational belief. If there are no such conditions, all belief ascriptions must be treated as atomic: which is implausible. If there are some, they must be settled on before an account of consistency can be complete. The reason is simple: it is that we have beliefs about our own beliefs. A set of first order beliefs is consistent if they can all be true together; but it is a lesson of Moore's paradox that consistency of second-order beliefs requires additional constraints. If someone both believes that p and that he does not believe that p, the propositions he believes might all be true together, yet he is inconsistent. And the characterization of second order consistency will remain incomplete, so long as nothing is said about the consistency of first order belief ascriptions. Suppose someone says and believes: "I am inconsistent: I believe both p and ~p." This is "indefensible": but is it insight, or nonsense? Breast-beating of this sort is guaranteed success: something he believes is bound to be false. But that remains diagnostically frustrating: is he inconsistent because what he said is true, or on the contrary because it is inconsistent? (shrink)

For those of us who are sympathetic to the research program of cognitive science, it is especially useful to face the deepest and sharpest critic of that program. Charles Taylor, who defines himself as a ‘hedgehog’ whose ‘single rather tightly related agenda’ fits into a very ancient and rather elusive debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism, may well be that critic. My ambition in this paper is to distill Taylor’s central objection to the cognitive science approach to agency and the self (...) as it is expressed throughout Human Agency and Language. After trying to set out the core of this objection, I want to remark on some rather curious aspects of the dispute of which it is a part, and then sketch, in relation to one or two examples, what I take to be the most promising line of resistance to Taylor’s attack. I conclude with a proposal as to how Taylor may – narrowly – escape one logical consequence of his position, according to which he should stop knocking the cognitive science program and instead go to work building a robot. (shrink)

Introduction -- Function and destiny -- What's the good of thinking? -- Rationality, individual and collective -- Irrationality.

Even though the university has the potential to help humanity in what amounts to a paradigmatic transition, it has been very restrictive and very selective in the kinds of knowledges it validates. In fact, the kinds of knowledges in which it has excelled are those most responsible for the paradigmatic crisis in which humanity finds itself. In a nutshell, the paradigmatic change calls for cognitive justice, justice for the different ways of knowing that circulate in society. Cognitive justice is the (...) polar opposite of ‘anything goes’. The assumption is that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice, justice among knowledges. Looking back, while privileging one specific kind of knowledge and, indeed, granting it a cognitive monopoly, the university has been the privileged site for producing and legitimating cognitive injustice. As a result, the immense epistemic diversity of the world has been ignored or suppressed. In the following, I identify the problem and the promise for overcoming it. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers have paid increasing attention to the empirical research on emotions that has blossomed in many areas of the social sciences. In this paper, I first sketch the common roots of science and philosophy in Ancient Greek thought. I illustrate the way that specific empirical sciences can be regarded as branching out from a central trunk of philosophical speculation. On the basis of seven informal characterizations of what is distinctive about philosophical thinking, I then draw attention to the fact (...) that scientific progress frequently requires one to make adjustments to the way its basic terms are conceptualized, and thus cannot avoid philosophical thought. The character of emotions requires attention from many disciplines, and the links among those disciplines inevitably require a broader philosophical perspective to be understood. Thus, emotion science, and indeed all of science, is inextricably committed to philosophical assumptions that demand scrutiny. (shrink)

The main objective of our research is to analyze the correlation between the struggle for recognition, the National Truth Commission – CNV and collective memory. To achieve our goal, we propose to analyze memory from collective and social struggles evoking collective memory within an intersubjective relationship that involves disputes, negotiations, manipulations and forgetting. It is important to emphasize that the theoretical framework of our work is supported by the debate around the struggles for recognition. Therefore, we will verify, from Axel (...) Honneth, the moral grammar of the struggles around this reciprocal recognition and how this dynamic happens in current social practices and, ipso facto, we intend to articulate the discussion of the communication paradigm with collective memory. (shrink)

In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.

The movement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research from universities to big corporations has had a significant impact on the development of the field. In the past, AI research was primarily conducted in academic institutions, which foster a culture of peer reviewing and collaboration to enhance quality improvements. The growing interest in AI among corporations, especially regarding Machine Learning (ML) technology, has shifted the focus of research from quality to quantity. Corporations have the resources to invest in large-scale ML projects and (...) they are often more interested in fast results than in ensuring that AI algorithms are reliable and safe. This paper proposes that the description of a Darwinian process made by the mathematician and physicist Freeman Dyson can be used to understand the implications of ML research scenario. The context of the Darwinian process—or lack thereof—can be used to draw a parallel between historical and current implications of technology expansion strongly driven by economic interests, making clear the consequences of shifting AI research from academia to industry. Finally, this paper indicates future directions for AI research to create a healthier environment for the evolution of ML technology. (shrink)

The study of consciousness is poised today at interesting crossroads. There has been a surge of research into various neurobiological underpinnings of consciousness in the past decade. The present article looks at the theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially the ones that neurobiology, cognitive neuroscience and cognitive psychology have to offer. We will first discuss the origin and etymology of word consciousness and its usage. Neurobiological correlates of consciousness are discussed with structures like the ascending reticular activating system, the amygdala, (...) the cerebellum, the thalamus, the frontoparietal circuits, the prefrontal cortex and the precuneus. The cellular and microlevel theories of consciousness and cerebral activity at the neuronal level contributing to consciousness are highlighted, along with the various theories posited in this area. The role of neuronal assemblies and circuits along with firing patterns and their ramifications for the understanding of consciousness are discussed. A section on the role of anaesthesia and its links to consciousness is presented, along with details of split-brain studies in consciousness and altered states of awareness, including the vegetative states. The article finally discusses the progress cognitive psychology has made in identifying and theorising various perspectives of consciousness, perceptual awareness and conscious processing. Both recent and past researches are highlighted. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with the pitfalls, if present. A need for integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed, to enable one to reach a theory that explains the ultimate neurobiology of consciousness. (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos analizar las relaciones entre exilio, lengua y territorio en una lectura de poemas seleccionados de los libros Vicio de Miami (1997) y Confesiones del estrangulador de Flagler Street (1998), de Néstor Díaz de Villegas (Cienfuegos, Cuba, 1956). El eje propuesto pretende comprender, por un lado, algunos aspectos de su poética, como aparece en sus primeros libros publicados; por otro, ponerla en perspectiva respecto a la condición del exilio cubano en los Estados Unidos en la época (...) de la crisis de Mariel (1980), especialmente desde sus repercusiones en el campo de la cultura. (shrink)

À quoi bon la pensée? Pour de nombreux chercheurs, inspirés par les théories évolutionnistes, la pensée réfléchie est utile à notre espèce. Elle lui confère des avantages importants et contribue à son succès reproductif. Pourtant ses avantages ne sont pas si évidents. La pensée ne figure ni dans les mécanismes de l'évolution qui ont façonné la vie, ni parmi les procédés dont se servent la plupart des organismes pour s'y maintenir. Dans Évolution et rationalité, Ronald de Sousa montre que, (...) pour comprendre les avantages de la pensée réfléchie, il faut changer nos présupposés relatifs à la rationalité et reconnaître la multiplicité de ses dimensions. La rationalité ne nous sert pas seulement à avoir des croyances vraies et à agir de manière efficace dans un environnement changeant. Elle nous aide à gérer nos plaisirs et nos peines dans le temps et nous permet d'envisager des situations qui n'existent pas. En général, le statut de la rationalité comme ensemble de capacités ayant évolué dans le cours de l'histoire naturelle de notre espèce, passant des tropismes aux désirs et de la détection à la représentation, n'a pas été pris suffisamment au sérieux. Suivre ce processus d'évolution de la rationalité permet de comprendre comment elle est devenue une norme, mais aussi pourquoi il lui arrive aussi souvent d'échouer. Ronald de Sousa a profondément modifié nos façons de concevoir les émotions. Avec Évolution et rationalité, il pourrait avoir une influence aussi décisive sur nos façons de concevoir la rationalité. (shrink)

ENTREVISTA COM PROFESSORAS(ES) DE FILOSOFIA DO ENSINO MÉDIO DO CEARÁ – BLOCO IICom: Dayane Evellin de Sousa Costa, Emilson Silva LopesPor: Antônio Alex Pereira de Sousa, Paulo Willame Araújo de Lima.

Open peer commentary on the article “Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” by Ben Sweeting. Upshot: I claim that the parallels between design research, second-order cybernetics and second-order science, as discussed by Sweeting in the target article, are more explicit in digital design. The discussion of SOC and SOS can point towards the creation of an epistemological foundation to digital design, where self-reflexivity and the inclusion of the observer are central questions.